

**MEMORANDUM**

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

**TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT**

**March 2, 1982**

**TO: SITUATION ROOM**

**Please LDX to:**

**Mr. Stephen Seafanovich  
Department of State/SP  
Room 7330 (632-1964)**

**Colonel Clelland Downs  
Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Pentagon  
Room 1E-965 (695-5630)**

**Lt Col Martin L. Brandtner  
OSD, The Pentagon  
Room 4E-830 (697-8360) For Mr. Bing West and  
Mr. Dave Shilling**

**Mr. Henry Rowen  
Hq CIA, Langley  
Room 7E-63**

**Allan Myer (5004)**

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NSC review completed.

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Draft of NSSD 1-82, Parts I and II

U.S. National Security Strategy

Part I

National Objectives and the International Environment

Broad Purposes of U.S. National Security Policy

The national security policy of the United States shall serve the following broad purposes:

- To preserve the political identity, framework and institutions of the United States as embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. (U)
- To protect the United States -- its national territory, citizenry, military forces, and assets abroad -- from military, paramilitary, or terrorist attack. (U)
- To foster the economic well-being of the United States, in particular, by maintaining and strengthening the nation's industrial, agricultural and technological base and by ensuring access to foreign markets and resources. (U)
- To foster an international order supportive of the vital interests of the United States by maintaining and strengthening constructive, cooperative relationships and alliances, and by encouraging and reinforcing wherever possible and practicable, freedom, rule of law, economic development and national independence throughout the world. (U)

The International Environment

United States national security policy will be guided by the following assessment of the current international situation and of trends and prospective developments affecting the pursuit of our broad objectives. (U)

The decade of the 1980s will pose the greatest challenge to the survival and well-being of the nation since World War II. The Soviet Union is and will remain for the foreseeable future the most formidable threat to the United States and to American interests globally. The growth of Soviet military power over the

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Review March 5, 2002

Classified & Extended by William P. Clark

Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

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last decade has called into question the ability of the United States and its allies to deter attack by the Soviet Union and its allies across the spectrum of conflict. At the same time, the Soviet policy of unparalleled global expansionism challenges the strategic interests and position of the United States around the world. (S)

The loss of U.S. nuclear superiority means that the U.S. cannot depend on nuclear forces to offset our general purpose force deficiencies. Rough strategic parity, and expanded Soviet conventional capabilities including a growing capability to project Soviet military power, have increased the relative importance of U.S. and allied conventional capabilities. The increased likelihood of U.S.-Soviet conflicts, or a U.S.-Soviet conflict which could be both global and protracted, heightens the need for a substantial U.S. industrial base for mobilization. (TS)

Building on their strengthened military position, the Soviets have developed a comprehensive and sophisticated political/military/economic strategy combining selective use of their own and proxy military and security forces, arms sales and grants, economic incentives, and disincentives, manipulation of terrorist and subversive organizations, diplomatic and arms control initiatives, and propaganda and disinformation activities. The near-term objectives of this strategy are to extend Soviet influence globally, and to weaken the United States, first by blocking access to strategic resources and land and sea routes; second, by isolating the U.S. by fomenting disharmony with allies, friends, and neutrals, and third, by undermining political will in the West. (S)

At the same time, the Soviets will continue to have important vulnerabilities. The economies and the social systems of the Soviet Union and of most Soviet allies continue to exhibit serious structural weaknesses; the appeal of Communist ideologies appears to be decreasing throughout much of the world, including the Soviet bloc itself; the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan has revealed some of the limitations on the effectiveness of Soviet power projection capabilities; non-Russian nationalities are growing relative to the dominant Russian population; events in Poland have underlined, and could contribute further to, the internal weakness of most Warsaw Pact countries. (S)

In the Near East and Southwest Asia, the chronic instability of the region both within and among states, including the Arab-Israel conflict, the rise of militant nationalist and religious movements, together with an expanded Soviet presence, poses a critical threat to Western political, economic and security interests. (S)

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The People's Republic of China remains hostile to the Soviet Union and its Vietnamese client, and appears to have begun an ideological evolution away from Soviet-style Communism; as such, it is an important factor in United States global policy toward the Soviet Union. At the same time, the uncertainties of China's future internal evolution and the possibility of a closer relationship with the USSR pose a latent long-term threat to U.S. and allied interests. (TS)

Unstable governments, weak political institutions, and inefficient, unproductive economies, rising expectations, rapid social change, the persistence of traditional conflicts and the prevalence of violence, create opportunities for Soviet expansion in many countries of the Developing World. (S)

Acceleration of efforts by several nations to acquire nuclear weapons threatens the viability of the international non-proliferation regime, with potentially serious consequences for regional stability as well as for the security of the United States. (S)

The readiness of our major allies to expand their military programs significantly and to rethink political and military strategies in the light of the increasing Soviet threat are limited by economic requirements, domestic political conditions and differing views of the nature and objectives of the adversary. However, the economic strength and shared interests and values of the nations within the Western alliance are assets of great importance if effectively mobilized. (S)

### Objectives of U.S. National Security Policy

The national security policy of the United States will be guided by the following objectives globally:

- To deter military attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its allies, and other important countries across the spectrum of conflict, to defeat such attack should deterrence fail, and to prevent or neutralize Soviet efforts to intimidate or coerce the U.S. or others through its military power. (S)
- To strengthen the influence of the U.S. throughout the world by strengthening existing alliances, by improving relations with other nations that have potential strategic importance for us, by forming and supporting coalitions of states friendly to U.S. interests, by selective diplomatic and economic initiatives, by economic policies that enhance our influence, by helping to resolve regional conflicts that threaten U.S. interests, and by expanded political action and information efforts. (S)

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- To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces. (S)
- To neutralize the efforts of the USSR to increase its influence through diplomacy, arms transfers, economic pressure, political action, propaganda, and disinformation. (S)
- To foster, if possible in concert with our allies, restraint in Soviet military spending, discourage Soviet adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance system by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings, and to encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries. (TS)
- To limit the growth of, and where possible, to reduce Soviet military capabilities by demonstrating the sustained commitment of the U.S. to increase its military strength to redress any significant Soviet imbalance favoring the Soviet Union, to pursue equitable and verifiable arms control agreements that limit Soviet power, and to prevent the flow of militarily significant technologies and resources to the Soviet Union. (TS)
- To ensure the U.S. access to foreign markets, and to ensure the U.S. and its allies and friends access to foreign energy and mineral resources. (U)
- To ensure U.S. access to space and the oceans. (U)
- To discourage further proliferation of nuclear weapons. (U)
- To encourage economic development and the growth of humane social practices and political orders in the Third World. To encourage and strongly support aid, trade, and investment programs that promote economic development and the growth of humane social and political orders in the Third World. (U)
- To ensure a well-functioning international economic system with minimal distortions to trade and investment and broadly agreed and respected rules for managing and resolving differences. (U)

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In addition to the foregoing, U.S. national security policy will be guided by the following operational objectives in specific regions:

- In Europe, to preserve the NATO alliance, while strengthening NATO capabilities and, if necessary, adjusting NATO strategy to deter and defeat the threat posed by dramatically improved Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces; to counter West European political trends that inhibit effective U.S. and allied action in this direction; to encourage the European allies to provide support for our objectives in other regions, particularly Southwest Asia; to work with the Europeans in their effort to overcome the serious economic problems that have limited the freedom of action of certain Western governments; to increase the costs of Soviet repression of popular movements and institutions in Poland and other East European countries, and to maximize prospects for their independent evolution. (TS)
- In the Western Hemisphere, to blunt and contain the projection of Soviet and Cuban military power and influence in the Caribbean Basin and South America; to reduce and if possible eliminate Soviet influence in Cuba; to discourage the USSR from using Cuba as a base for mounting a strategic threat to the security of the hemisphere; to strengthen U.S. political and military relationships with key countries; and to promote sustained economic progress in the Caribbean Basin area, and to assist friendly governments in combatting Marxist-Leninist insurgencies. (TS)
- In Africa, to defeat aggression, subversive and terrorist activities sponsored by Libya or other forces hostile to U.S. interests; to secure the withdrawal of Soviet and Soviet proxy forces on the continent; to ensure U.S. and allied access to strategically important mineral resources, while promoting improvement in regional racial policies; and to establish a U.S. presence on the continent and adjacent areas. (TS)
- In Asia, to preserve our existing alliances; to encourage Japan, whose relationship with the U.S. is the cornerstone of U.S. policy in East Asia, to increase its military capabilities to be able to participate meaningfully with the U.S. in a national division of labor in the Asia-Pacific area by attaining the self-defense power necessary to provide for regional security in the Northeast Pacific in this

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decade; to deter aggression by North Korea and Vietnam, and to secure the withdrawal or increase the costs of the Vietnamese presence in Laos and Kampuchea; while maintaining our unofficial relationship and fulfilling our obligations to Taiwan, preserve a broad, effective working relationship with the PRC, and to encourage its interest in friendship with the U.S. and to strengthen its ability to resist Soviet invasion and intimidation, so that the PRC remains a strategic counter against the Soviet Union without posing a threat to U.S. and allied interests over the long term; encourage the economic and political development of the ASEAN states as a source of stability within Southeast Asia; to strengthen the U.S. strategic relationship with Australia and New Zealand within the ANZUS framework. (TS)

-- In the Near East, Southwest and South Asia, to ensure Western access to Persian Gulf oil; to gain and maintain sufficient influence and presence to support U.S. interests in the region; to preserve the independence of Israel and other key states in the region and to strengthen their ability to resist aggression or subversion by a regional or extra-regional power or movement; to gain the cooperation of countries outside the region in accomplishing our various objectives in the region; to enhance the possibility of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict in a manner that respects the security interests of all parties; to secure the withdrawal or increase the costs of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan; to deter or frustrate further military intervention or subversion by the Soviet Union, Soviet proxies, or regional states or movements hostile to Western interests; to ensure a network of military facilities in the region for the rapid introduction of sizeable U.S. forces; to encourage India to seek greater independence from the Soviet Union, and to establish stable relations with other states in the region; and to support the further development of a secure and independent Pakistan. (T)

## Part II

### Implementing Strategies

The overall national objectives of the United States are to be implemented through an interlocking set of strategies that principally include the following:

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- information;
- economic;
- military.

The full articulation of U.S. National Strategy requires the development and integration of each set of strategies into a comprehensive whole. The various instruments of U.S. national power and the strategies for their use do not stand alone; rather, they are inextricably linked and, to be effective, must be mutually supportive. Part I of this study provides the common starting point towards this end.

The overall study process will build upon this common starting point by means of individual study segments. Part III of this study will consider the military component only. The other components of U.S. national strategy as outlined above will be the subject of companion studies to be undertaken on an expeditious basis in the near future. Additional studies will also be undertaken concerning the role of intelligence, covert operations, and arms control in supporting the implementing strategies. (C)

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